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On December 8th, 1993, President Bill Clinton signed the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), a treaty that eliminated trade barriers between the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico.2 At the time, Mexico’s tariffs were five times 
higher than the United States’ tariffs.3 Supporters of the agreement touted job 
creation and lower costs for consumers, but detractors warned it would cause a “giant 
sucking sound” of jobs flowing to Mexico.4 After signing, President Clinton 
remarked, “I believe that NAFTA will create a million jobs in the first five years of 
its impact. And I believe that that is many more jobs than will be lost, as inevitably 
some will be as always happens when you open up the mix to a new range of 
competition.”5 
As President Clinton candidly observed, free trade agreements can reshape 
industries and leave many people unemployed for a period of time. About one-third 
of U.S. residents do not support free trade.6 Unlike free trade’s immediate burden of 
worker displacement, free trade benefits typically indirectly filter through the larger 
populations over time.7 Free trade agreements can make products less costly for 
consumers, spur economic growth, and encourage technological advances through 
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increased competition.8 Economists generally agree that the “diffuse and long-term 
benefits” of free trade outweigh the “concentrated short-term costs.”9 
NAFTA and its successor agreement, the United States-Mexico-Canada 
Agreement (“USMCA”), embody the free trade debate.10 NAFTA brought lower 
prices to consumers and allowed U.S. agriculture to flourish with tariff-free exports 
to Mexico, but it contributed to the U.S. manufacturing decline by incentivizing 
companies to outsource to low-wage regions in Mexico.11 Noting the manufacturing 
job loss, President Trump negotiated the USMCA, often referred to as the “new 
NAFTA,” which replaced NAFTA on July 1, 2020.12 As this Note will discuss, the 
USMCA strays away from free trade principles in an effort to stimulate U.S. 
manufacturing.13  
This Note addresses the USMCA’s key impacts in comparison to NAFTA. 
Because Mexico is one of the U.S.’s largest trade partners and because U.S. trade 
with Mexico is a common subject of political debate, this Note focuses primarily on 
NAFTA and the USMCA as they relate to the U.S.-Mexico trade relationship.14 Part 
I of this Note provides an overview of NAFTA and the USMCA. Part II discusses 
NAFTA’s effects on the U.S. agricultural sector, a key beneficiary of NAFTA, and 
argues that the USMCA is a slight improvement over NAFTA for that sector. Part 
III analyzes NAFTA’s effects on the U.S. manufacturing sector and argues that the 
USMCA poses significant risks to that sector. Finally, part IV concludes by 
advocating that the USMCA is unlikely to lead to substantial U.S. economic 
improvements over NAFTA. 
 
I. OVERVIEW OF NAFTA AND THE USMCA 
 
A.  NAFTA Ushered in an Era of Increased Trade and Large Deficits 
 
Technological developments and increasing trade with other countries 
complicate the determination of NAFTA’s precise effects on the North American 
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economy.15 Still, the agreement clearly proliferated trade between the North 
American countries.16 From 1993 to 2015, trade between the United States and 
Mexico more than quintupled, increasing from $85.2 billion to $481.5 billion.17  
NAFTA simultaneously ushered in unprecedented trade deficits with Mexico. A 
trade deficit occurs when a country imports more than it exports.18 The world’s most 
prosperous countries often run trade deficits in certain areas, but elected officials and 
voters generally prefer trade surpluses.19 In the nine years immediately preceding 
NAFTA, the U.S. averaged a $1.5 billion goods trade deficit with Mexico, and 
enjoyed a surplus three out of the nine years.20 In NAFTA’s first ten years, the U.S. 
goods trade with Mexico averaged a $21.8 billion deficit which continues to grow.21 
NAFTA went into force on January 1, 1994.22 Goods trade with Mexico between 
1994 and 2019 averaged a $47.6 billion deficit, including a staggering $101.4 billion 
in 2019.23 Since 1995, the U.S. has not experienced a single goods trade surplus with 
Mexico.24  
These trade deficits are more than just numbers—they represent U.S. workers 
forced to change careers in an uncertain time. By 2010, trade deficits with Mexico 
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eliminated an estimated 682,900 jobs, 60% of which were in manufacturing.25 
Manufacturing employment in the U.S. declined by 30% between 1993 and 2016.26 
Mexico often experienced manufacturing trade deficits with the U.S. before NAFTA, 
but the country now enjoys a manufacturing trade surplus of over $58 billion.27 
Abandoned factories and displaced workers in Ohio and Michigan illustrate the 
effects of the post-NAFTA trade imbalance with Mexico.28 Meanwhile, U.S. farmers 
excelled under NAFTA.29 The U.S. experienced an agricultural trade surplus with 
Mexico for twenty of the agreement’s first twenty-three years.30  
Since the beginning of his campaign, President Trump repeatedly called for the 
repeal or renegotiation of NAFTA, referring to it as the “worst trade deal in history.31 
In May of 2018, Trump imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Mexico 
and Canada, effectively violating NAFTA.32 Less than a week later, Mexico enacted 
retaliatory tariffs on various U.S. exports to Mexico, including agricultural 
products.33 Canada followed suit and enacted similar tariffs in July 2018.34 
 
B. The USMCA Emerges as the “New NAFTA” 
 
On September 30, 2018, the dust settled from the trade disputes and the United 
States, Mexico, and Canada negotiated a NAFTA replacement: the USMCA.35 The 
USMCA retains tariff-free treatment for all products that were tariff-free under 
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NAFTA, but also provides farmers with new access to Canadian markets.36 The 
USMCA aims to revitalize U.S. manufacturing by raising labor standards for 
Mexican workers and employing “rules of origin” provisions, which condition tariff-
free treatment on a certain percentage of a finished good’s components being 
manufactured in the NAFTA region.37 
 
II. U.S. AGRICULTURE: NAFTA VS. THE USMCA 
 
A. U.S. Agriculture Under NAFTA 
 
i.  The U.S. Agricultural Sector Flourished Under NAFTA 
 
U.S. farmers fared well under NAFTA. Over eighty agricultural groups and 
corporations, representing every sector of the agricultural industry, petitioned jointly 
to the U.S. Secretary of Commerce explaining NAFTA’s positive impacts on the 
industry.38 Removal of trade barriers within the NAFTA region gave U.S. farmers 
access to new customers, which massively increased agricultural exports.39 Under 
NAFTA, U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico more than quintupled.40  
NAFTA helped Mexico and Canada to become critical sources of supply and 
demand for U.S. farmers.41 According to the United States Department of 
Agriculture (“USDA”) NAFTA supported 25,000 jobs related to corn farming and 
facilitated one-third of U.S. pork exports and over half of U.S. vegetable exports.42 
NAFTA set the stage for Mexico to become the U.S.’s top export customer for 
several U.S. grown products, including beef, rice, soybean meal, corn sweeteners, 
and apples.43  
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U.S. government subsidies, particularly with respect to corn production, helped 
American farmers excel under NAFTA.44 Mexico is the U.S. corn industry’s biggest 
customer.45 Before NAFTA, the Mexican government limited corn imports to times 
when its own production failed to meet the country’s needs.46 NAFTA prohibited 
Mexico from limiting its corn imports but still allowed the U.S. to subsidize its 
farmers.47 After NAFTA, U.S. corn quickly flooded the Mexican market.48 More 
corn drove down the price of corn in Mexico, which meant that many Mexican 
farmers could no longer sell corn at a price sufficient to support themselves.49 In 
NAFTA’s first decade, over 900,000 Mexican farmers lost their jobs.50  
NAFTA is not without criticism from U.S. farmers. The last few decades have 
marked a decline of local family farms and the rise of large, industrial farms.51 
NAFTA increased the “size of the pie,” but industrial farms now “control most of 
the slices.”52 Despite the massive increase in agricultural exports, America shed over 
100,000 farms between 2011 and 2018.53  NAFTA and globalization in general likely 
contributed to the industry consolidation.54 Generally, free trade agreements allow 
farmers from all over the world to sell their crops in U.S. markets, which makes 
prices lower and more volatile.55 Large industrial farms typically operate with lower 
costs, which allows them to sell at lower prices and withstand price fluctuations.56  
According to the USDA, the change in industry composition “reflects a farm 
economy experiencing rapid technological change.”57 Farms that implement new 
technology can produce more crops at cheaper prices, which naturally drives out 
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smaller, less efficient competing farmers. Ultimately, NAFTA simply facilitated 
unobstructed access to new markets, which expanded the industry and naturally 
propelled larger businesses to the top.58 Placing trade barriers against Mexico, 
inevitably prompting retaliatory tariffs and reducing demand for U.S. crops from all 
farmers, is simply not a preferred method for curbing consolidation in the agricultural 
sector. 
Farmers also criticize NAFTA because it allowed Canada to retain a pricing 
system that discriminated against U.S. farmers.59 Canada applies a strict import quota 
system on dairy products and levies tariffs as high as 300% for imports that exceed 
the quota.60 In 2017, Canada imposed even more protections for its dairy industry by 
implementing a milk pricing system.61 Fortunately, the USMCA limits Canada’s 
ability to impose these trade barriers.62 
 
ii. Post-2015 Agricultural Trade Deficits Illustrate  
the Danger of Trade Barriers 
 
NAFTA’s success for the agricultural sector may be reflected by the U.S.-Mexico 
agricultural trade balance. The U.S. experienced an agricultural trade surplus with 
Mexico every year between 1991 and 2015.63 Between 2016 and 2018, however, the 
U.S. averaged a $6 billion trade deficit with Mexico.64 Three factors primarily caused 
these deficits. 
 First, the U.S. dollar has been relatively strong compared to the Mexican Peso 
since 2015.65 A stronger currency results in cheaper imports and more expensive 
exports.66 With most countries, the value of its currency fluctuates with the strength 
of the economy.67 Generally, the stronger the economy, the higher-priced the 
 
58 Johnson & Fromartz, supra note 51.   
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62 See Heather Long, The USMCA is Finally Done. Here’s What is in It., WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2019, 
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63 See RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10800, AGRIC. TRADE BALANCES UNDER 
NAFTA (Dec. 29, 2017), https://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads//assets/crs/IF10800.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VHV6-FHK9]. 
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facts-us-agri-trade.html [https://perma.cc/R2M8-Z3JZ].  
66 Id.  
67 See Tejvan Pettinger, Is a Strong Economy Generally Accompanied by a Strong Currency?, ECON. 
HELP (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/143224/economics/is-a-strong-economy-
generally-accompanied-by-a-strong-currency/ [https://perma.cc/P5PN-3F6D]. 
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currency.68 Lower priced currency makes a country’s exports more competitive.69 
For example, suppose that the dollar is priced highly so that two pesos are worth one 
dollar. Mexican citizens would have to spend two pesos to buy a U.S. product worth 
one dollar, but U.S. residents would only need to spend one dollar to buy a Mexican 
product worth two pesos. In fact, “Mexico’s exchange rates exhibit almost perfect 
negative correlation with [the U.S.] agricultural trade surplus and deficit.”70 As the 
dollar strengthens, exports to Mexico decrease, adversely affecting the U.S. trade 
balance.71  
Second, the prices of primary U.S. agricultural exports fell.72 If the crops sold in 
2017 were sold at 2012 prices, when crops were selling at a record high, the deficit 
would have been drastically reduced.73 Third, President Trump’s trade disputes 
increased the deficits. In response to President Trump’s threats to withdraw from 
NAFTA, Mexican farming operations lost confidence in the U.S. as a reliable 
supplier and began to search for alternate sources.74 In 2017, Mexican buyers 
imported ten times more corn from Brazil than in 2016.75   
In May 2018, President Trump enacted tariffs against Mexican imports, to which 
Mexico responded with retaliatory tariffs.76 The Congressional Research Service 
(“CRS”) predicted that retaliatory tariffs could adversely impact U.S. farmers by 
eroding their competitiveness in foreign markets.77 The CRS also noted that if the 
tariffs remain in effect long-term, U.S. farmers could lose their market share as 
suppliers seek out cheaper alternatives.78 A Purdue University study predicted U.S. 
agricultural exports could be reduced by as much as $8 billion after markets adjust 
to the retaliatory tariffs.79 
The effects of Mexico’s past retaliatory tariffs lend credence to these predictions. 
In response to the U.S.’s violation of NAFTA trucking provisions, Mexico levied 
retaliatory tariffs against U.S. agricultural products from 2009 until 2011.80 During 
this period of tariffs, U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico fell by $1.1 billion—a 
 
68 Id. 
69 Burak et al., supra note 65; see also Pettinger, supra note 67.  
70 Burak et al., supra note 65. 
71 See id.  
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 P.J. Huffstutter & Adriana Barrera, Exclusive: As Trump Trashes NAFTA, Mexico Turns to 




76 JENNY HOPKINSON, CONG. RES. SERV., R45448, PROFILES AND EFFECTS OF RETALIATORY 




79 Maksym Chepeliev et al., How U.S. Agriculture Will Fare Under the USMCA and Retaliatory 
Tariffs 18 (Glob. Trade Analysis Project, Working Paper No. 84, 2018).  
80 ERS Directive WRS-15-01, NAFTA at 20: North America’s Free-Trade Area and Its Impact on 
Agriculture (U.S.D.A. 2015), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/outlooks/40485/51265_wrs-15-
01.pdf?v=7367.6 [https://perma.cc/HL7X-HPUT]. 
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reduction of nearly 22%.81 Mexico’s history of retaliatory tariffs illustrates the need 
for the USMCA to retain tariff-free treatment of U.S. agricultural exports.  
 
B. The USMCA Improves the U.S. Agricultural Trade Position 
 
The USMCA leaves the NAFTA agricultural provisions largely unchanged.82 
Under the USMCA, “[a]ll food and agriculture products that [had] zero tariffs under 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will remain at zero tariffs.”83 
As its key agricultural change, the USMCA expanded access to the Canadian 
market.84 The USMCA keeps Canada’s import quota and dairy pricing systems 
largely in place but allows the U.S. to export more “class 7” dairy products to 
Canada.85 This increased dairy access amounts to an additional 2.6% of Canada’s 
dairy market.86 The USMCA also allows the U.S. to export to Canada more chicken, 
turkey, and eggs.87 
The U.S. Farm Bureau predicts that the USMCA will increase U.S. agricultural 
exports by $2 billion and increase gross domestic product by $65 billion.88 An 
October 2018 study by the Farm Foundation more conservatively estimates that the 
USMCA would increase agricultural exports to Canada by $450 million, which is 
about 1% of current exports under NAFTA.89 The USMCA will likely help U.S. 
farmers, because it preserves the prohibition of trade barriers between the North 
American countries, reduces uncertainty caused by retaliatory tariffs, and removes 
Canadian trade barriers. The USMCA’s potential effect on U.S. manufacturing, 










82 See FAS Directive 0202.19, supra note 36.  
83 Id. 
84 See The USMCA is Finally Done, supra note 62.  
85 Id. 
86 Bob Bryan & Joseph Zeballos-Roig, Trump's New Major Trade Deal Looks a Lot Like NAFTA. 
Here are Key Differences Between Them., MKT. INSIDER (Dec. 10, 2019, 3:43 PM), 
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/us-canada-mexico-trade-deal-usmca-nafta-details-
dairy-auto-dispute-resolution-2018-10-1027579947 [https://perma.cc/JA5C-B4AR].  
87 United States–Mexico–Canada Trade Fact Sheet Agriculture: Market Access and Dairy Outcomes 
of the USMC Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/fact-sheets/market-access-and-dairy-outcomes 
[https://perma.cc/Z9DJ-4ACJ]. 
88 USMCA, AM. FARM BUREAU FED’N, https://www.fb.org/issues/trade/usmca/ 
[https://perma.cc/A3XQ-X56Y]. 
89 ANITA REGMI, CONG. RES. SERV., R45661, AGRICULTURAL PROVISIONS OF THE U.S.-MEXICO-
CANADA AGREEMENT 14 (Apr. 8, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45661.pdf [https://perma.cc/8F9A-
28VY].  
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III. U.S. MANUFACTURING: NAFTA VS. THE USMCA 
 
A. U.S. Manufacturing Suffered Under NAFTA, But Not Because of NAFTA 
 
i. The U.S. Manufacturing Decline 
 
Foreign goods, in 1960, made up only 8% of U.S. purchases.90 By 2011, that 
number rose to nearly 60%.91 As U.S. residents purchased less U.S.-made goods, 
U.S. factories laid off workers.92 Since January 2000, U.S. manufacturing 
employment has fallen approximately 30%, from 17.2 million jobs to 12.2 million 
jobs.93 The U.S. automobile industry alone lost 350,000 jobs—approximately 1/3 of 
all workers—during NAFTA’s first two decades.94 
Some economists attribute the manufacturing decline to increased technology 
rather than free trade.95 Automation allows factories to produce more products using 
fewer employees, which causes job loss.96 Still, NAFTA’s enactment clearly 
coincides with a decrease in U.S. manufacturing and an increase in Mexican 
manufacturing. U.S. foreign direct investment (“FDI”) in Mexico statistics support 
this conclusion.97 Generally, FDI occurs when a company invests in operations in a 
different country.98 Businesses commonly produce FDI by building a new factory in 
another country or by purchasing an existing business in another country.99 From 
1993 to 2017, U.S. FDI in Mexico increased over 600% from $15.2 billion to $109.7 
billion.100 Under NAFTA, more U.S. companies invested resources in their 
operations in Mexico.101  
The disparity in manufacturing wages between the U.S. and Mexico incentivizes 
companies to relocate south of the border.102 For example, in the late 2000s, Delphi 
 
90 Bradley Blackburn & Eric Noll, Made in America: A Brief History of U.S. Manufacturing, ABC 
NEWS (Feb. 4, 2011, 6:04 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/made-america-middle-class-built-
manufacturing-jobs/story?id=12916118 [https://perma.cc/3ENV-YZVS]. 
91 Id. 
92 See id.; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, All Employees, Manufacturing, FRED ECON. DATA, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MANEMP [https://perma.cc/H2J3-8ALN].  
93 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 92. 
94 Eduardo Porter, Nafta May Have Saved Many Autoworkers’ Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/business/economy/nafta-may-have-saved-many-autoworkers-
jobs.html?auth=login-email&login=email [https://perma.cc/BD3M-EK72]. 
95 Jeffry Bartash, China Really is to Blame for Millions of Lost U.S. Manufacturing Jobs, New Study 
Finds, MARKETWATCH (May 14, 2018, 1:30 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/china-really-is-
to-blame-for-millions-of-lost-us-manufacturing-jobs-new-study-finds-2018-05-14 
[https://perma.cc/K2JH-PMAH].   
96 Id. 
97 VILLARREAL IF11175, supra note 20; M. ANGELES VILLARREAL, CONG. RES. SERV., RL32934, 
U.S.-MEXICO ECONOMIC RELATIONS: TRENDS, ISSUES, AND IMPLICATIONS (Jun. 25, 2020), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf [https://perma.cc/AE79-X4ZR] [hereinafter VILLARREAL 
RL32934]. 
98 James Chen, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 24, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fdi.asp [https://perma.cc/TL38-G59J]. 
99 Id. 
100 VILLARREAL IF11175, supra note 20.  
101 VILLARREAL RL32934, supra note 97. 
102 See Linthicum, supra note 28. 
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Automotive, once one of the largest employers in northern Ohio, relocated their 
factory from northern Ohio to Mexico.103 Delphi employees in Ohio made $30 per 
hour, but Delphi employees in Mexico earn only $1 per hour.104 Another company, 
Brake Parts Inc., manufactured brake calipers in California for nearly thirty years.105 
In 2015, Brake Parts laid off 280 workers and relocated their factory to Mexico.106 
A Brake Parts executive explained that the company’s competitors were located in 
Mexico where they could pay workers only $3.50 to $4 per hour.107 Yet another 
company, Rexnord Corp., laid off 300 workers and moved their factory from 
Indianapolis to Mexico.108 Relocation to Mexico reduced Rexnord’s labor costs from 
$25 per hour with benefits to only $3 per hour without benefits—a cost savings of 
$15.5 million per year.109 Mondelez International, another company that relocated to 
Mexico, claimed its move saved $46 million per year.110  
Low wages in Mexico present a tempting opportunity to lower costs and 
maximize profits. Some may say greed drives these moves, but relocating can 
become a borderline necessity for a company after its competitors relocate. It is very 
difficult for a company paying workers $25 per hour to compete with a company in 
the same industry paying workers $3 per hour for the same work. Before NAFTA, 
the U.S. could mitigate the incentive to relocate by enacting trade barriers, but 
NAFTA prevented any such remedy.111  
 
ii. China May Be Primarily Responsible for the U.S. Manufacturing Decline  
 
Many economists argue that China, not NAFTA, caused the decline in U.S. 
manufacturing.112  From 2012 to 2019, the U.S. averaged a $354 billion trade deficit 
with China and only a $67.9 million trade deficit with Mexico.113 The trade deficit 
with China has quintupled since 2001, the year China joined the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”).114 This five-fold increase caused 3.4 million lost U.S. jobs, 
nearly 75% of which were in manufacturing.115 FDI figures also suggest that U.S. 




105 Jim Puzzanghera, These Three U.S. Companies Moved Jobs to Mexico. Here’s Why, L.A. TIMES 
(Dec. 19, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-mexico-jobs-20161212-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/J9W2-83HC].  





111 See VILLARREAL & FERGUSSON, supra note 3, at 5.  
112 See, e.g., Porter, supra note 94; NAFTA, 20 Years Later: Do the Benefits Outweigh the Costs?, 
supra note 25. 
113 Trade in Goods with China, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balance/c5700.html [https://perma.cc/F6C6-WD6K]; Trade in Goods with Mexico, supra note 20. 
114 Margot Roosevelt, California Lost More Manufacturing Jobs to China Than Any Other State, 
Report Says, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2020, 7:30 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-01-
30/la-fi-california-china-trade-job-loss [https://perma.cc/J8B2-TJS2]. 
115 ROBERT E. SCOTT & ZANE MOKHIBER, ECON. POL’Y INST., 156645, THE CHINA TOLL DEEPENS, 
2 (Oct. 23, 2018), https://files.epi.org/pdf/156645.pdf [https://perma.cc/BYR3-HBLS].  
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From 2001 to 2019, U.S. FDI in China increased ten-fold from approximately $12 
billion to approximately $116 billion.116 According to a professor at the Wharton 
School of the University of Pennsylvania, an Ivy League business school, the U.S.-
China trade imbalance means that “for every job we have lost in the U.S. to Mexico, 
five [jobs] were lost to China.”117 
Cheap Chinese currency and low Chinese wages power the U.S. job loss.118 
China controls its currency prices so that its currency is almost always cheaper than 
the dollar, which makes their goods cheaper than U.S. goods.119 Additionally, 
China’s manufacturing sector is competitive because the country’s low cost of living 
and subpar workers’ rights allow companies to pay their workers very low wages.120 
In 2018, Chinese manufacturing workers were paid an average $5.51 per hour,121 
while U.S. manufacturing workers were paid an average of $26.97 per hour—a 
disparity of over $20 per hour.122 Other Asian countries pay as little as $2.73 per 
hour.123 While Chinese wages are consistently rising in comparison to other Asian 
countries, U.S. manufacturing wages remain far less competitive than Chinese 
manufacturing wages.124 
 
iii. U.S. Manufacturing May Have Fared Worse Without NAFTA 
 
Many economists credit NAFTA for making the U.S. manufacturing more 
globally competitive by developing supply chains across North America.125 Much of 
the trade between the U.S. and Mexico occurs in the context of production sharing, 
with each country involved in different manufacturing steps with respect to the same 
 
116 Statista Research Department, Direct Investment Position of the United States in China From 
2000-2019, STATISTA (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/188629/united-states-direct-
investments-in-china-since-2000/ [https://perma.cc/V2PG-DGRW]. 
117 NAFTA, 20 Years Later: Do the Benefits Outweigh the Costs?, supra note 25. 
118 Bartash, supra note 95; Kimberly Amadeo, US Trade Deficit With China and Why It’s So High, 
BALANCE (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-china-trade-deficit-causes-effects-and-
solutions-3306277#annual-trade-deficit [https://perma.cc/Z8V7-JD3M] [hereinafter US Trade Deficit 
With China]; see also SCOTT & MOKHIBER, supra note 115, at 3, 5. 
119 E.g., US Trade Deficit With China, supra note 118; ROBERT E. SCOTT & WILL KIMBALL, ECON. 
POL’Y INST., BRIEFING PAPER 385, CHINA TRADE, OUTSOURCING AND JOBS, 21 (Dec. 11, 2014), 
https://files.epi.org/2014/bp385-china-trade-deficit.pdf [https://perma.cc/MW72-FKRL]. 
120 US Trade Deficit With China, supra note 118; see also SCOTT & KIMBALL, supra note 119, at 23. 
121 M. Szmigiera, Manufacturing Labor Costs Per Hour: China, Vietnam, Mexico 2016-2020, 
STATISTA (Mar. 12, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/744071/manufacturing-labor-costs-per-
hour-china-vietnam-mexico/ [https://perma.cc/7QEH-RTU5]. 
122 Statista Research Department, Hourly Earnings in U.S. Manufacturing 2006-2019, STATISTA 
(May 11, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/187380/hourly-earnings-in-us-manufacturing-since-
1965/ [https://perma.cc/RT9A-G8V6]. 
123 Szmigiera, supra note 121 (average manufacturing wage in Vietnam in 2018). 
124 See Sophia Yan, ‘Made in China’ Isn’t So Cheap Anymore, and That Could Spell Headache for 
Beijing, CNBC (Feb. 27, 2017, 12:37 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/27/chinese-wages-rise-made-
in-china-isnt-so-cheap-anymore.html [https://perma.cc/LQ39-ANA5]; see also Dmitriy Plekhanov, Is 
China’s Era of Cheap Labor Really Over?, DIPLOMAT (Dec. 13, 2017), 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/is-chinas-era-of-cheap-labor-really-over/ [https://perma.cc/PB88-
K9GU]. 
125 See Floyd, supra note 15; VILLARREAL & FERGUSSON, supra note 3, at 16; VILLARREAL IF11175, 
supra note 20. 
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final product.126  Taking advantage of cheap labor, many companies produce basic 
parts in Mexico and ship them to the U.S. to assemble the more complicated finished 
products.127 Despite the U.S. automobile industry shedding a third of its workforce, 
the total value added by car and car part makers in the U.S. is only slightly lower 
than it was in NAFTA’s first year.128 Underscoring the integration of manufacturing 
between the U.S. and Mexico, Delphi Automotive’s CFO warned that if the border 
were closed to trade, “in less than a week, all of the people who voted for [Trump] 
in Michigan and Ohio would be out of work.”129  
The automobile industry is especially integrated between the U.S. and Mexico. 
For example, the Honda CR-V is assembled in Mexico, but roughly 70% of its 
content is either U.S. or Canadian.130 This supply chain integration contributes to the 
4.9 million U.S. jobs created by trade with Mexico.131 This means that one out of 
twenty-nine U.S. jobs depends on the country’s economic relationship with 
Mexico.132 Gordon Hanson, a professor at the University of California, San Diego, 
explained to the New York Times that “[w]ithout the ability to move lower-wage 
jobs to Mexico we would have lost the whole [automobile] industry.”133 
From a cost perspective, low wages in Mexico provide an integral way for the 
U.S. to compete with Asia’s wages.134 Without NAFTA, it could be cheaper for 
companies to simply abandon the U.S.’s expensive labor entirely rather than 
incorporate the U.S. into their supply chains. A trade agreement that levies high 
tariffs on U.S. imports from Mexico could eliminate the cost feasibility of the 
NAFTA region. Instead of forcing manufacturing jobs back into the United States, 
high tariffs against Mexico have the potential to do just the opposite.  
 
B. The USMCA and Manufacturing 
 
i. “Rules of Origin” Provisions 
 
The USMCA implements “rules of origin” provisions to encourage 
manufacturers to employ more U.S. workers.135 Rules of origin provisions condition 
tariff-free treatment on exported finished goods using a certain percentage of 
components that were manufactured in the NAFTA region.136 Goods that do not meet 
the rules of origin requirements are subject to the “most-favored-nation” tariff rate.137 
 
126 VILLARREAL & FERGUSSON, supra note 3, at 16–17. 
127 Id. at 32.  
128 Porter, supra note 94. 
129 Linthicum, supra note 28. 
130 Porter, supra note 94. 
131 Alexia Fernández Campbell, Nearly 5 Million U.S. Jobs Depend on Trade With Mexico, ATLANTIC 
(Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/12/mexico-nafta-trade/510008/ 
[https://perma.cc/KR9H-GX6Q].  
132 Id.  
133 Porter, supra note 94. 
134 See id. 
135 Rebalancing Trade to Support Manufacturing, supra note 13. 
136 Sue Senger, Understanding the NAFTA Rules of Origin, SHIPPING SOLUTIONS (May 23, 2018), 
https://www.shippingsolutions.com/blog/nafta-rules-of-origin-part-1 [https://perma.cc/PEW3-AU8N].  
137 Id.  
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The USMCA increases the required percentage of components manufactured in a 
NAFTA region for several manufacturing industries, including automobiles, textiles, 
and cosmetics.138 The automobile rules of origin provisions may have the largest 
impact on the North American economy. At 3.5% of the U.S. gross domestic product, 
the automobile industry is one of the most important segments of the U.S. 
economy.139 
The USMCA contains several rules of origin provisions intended to stimulate 
growth in the U.S. automobile industry. The USMCA increases NAFTA’s rule of 
origin requirement by requiring at least 75% of an automobile’s components to be 
manufactured in the NAFTA region.140 That number was 62.5% under NAFTA.141 
In addition, 70% of a vehicle’s steel and aluminum must originate in North 
America.142  
The USMCA’s automobile rules of origin requirements could incentivize 
automobile producers to incorporate more of their supply chains in the NAFTA 
region. Under NAFTA, automobile producers have arranged their supply chains in 
the most efficient ways possible including sourcing some parts from outside of the 
NAFTA region.143 Faced with the new 75% requirement, businesses will likely 
compare the costs of changing their supply chains to the cost of a tariff and take 
whichever route is cheaper. Because automobile companies generally prefer to keep 
component sources near assembly plants to minimize delays, the 75% requirement 
may prompt companies to integrate more of their supply chains into the NAFTA-
region.144  
If businesses incorporate more of their supply chains into the NAFTA region, 
employment numbers will rise, but so will prices for consumers.145 If automobile 
manufacturers modify their pre-USMCA cost-minimizing supply chains to source 
more parts from the NAFTA region, they will likely pay more for those parts than 
before.146 Manufacturers may be able to absorb a portion of the costs as lost profit or 
 
138 See Rebalancing Trade to Support Manufacturing, supra note 13. 
139 KIM HILL ET AL., CTR.  AUTOMOTIVE RES., CONTRIBUTION OF THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY TO 
THE ECONOMIES OF ALL FIFTY STATES AND THE UNITED STATES (Apr. 2010), 
https://www.cargroup.org/publication/contribution-of-the-automotive-industry-to-the-economies-of-all-
fifty-state-and-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/4JKX-9PDX]. 
140 Kimberly Amadeo, Trump’s NAFTA Changes, BALANCE (Feb. 4, 2021), 
https://www.thebalance.com/donald-trump-nafta-4111368#6-changes-to-nafta-under-the-usmca 
[https://perma.cc/LRT9-E9BA][hereinafter Trump’s NAFTA Changes]. 
141 Id.  
142 M. ANGELES VILLARREAL ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., IF11387, USMCA: MOTOR VEHICLE 
PROVISIONS AND ISSUES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11387 
[https://perma.cc/8TYP-ATLX]. 
143 See Finbarr Bermingham, U.S. and Chinese Companies Fear Trump’s Coming Trade War On Car 
Industry, POLITICO (Apr. 17, 2019, 5:19 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/17/us-china-
trade-car-industry-1358959 [https://perma.cc/GR7C-X9SC]. 
144 Owen Stuart, How Will the Shift from NAFTA to USMCA Affect the Auto Industry?, INDUS. WK. 
(Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.industryweek.com/the-economy/article/22026500/how-will-the-shift-from-
nafta-to-usmca-affect-the-auto-industry [https://perma.cc/8VHY-HRSK]. 
145 E.g., VILLARREAL ET AL., supra note 142. 
146 Stuart, supra note 144. Automobile manufacturers have four main options for addressing this cost 
increase: (1) absorb the higher costs as lost profit, (2) renegotiate component supply contracts to pass the 
cost increase to suppliers, (3) change the product mix to make offerings less expensive, or (4) raise the 
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renegotiate supply contracts to push costs up the supply chain, but some of the cost 
increase will inevitably flow to consumer prices.147  
Automobile executives anticipate cost increases caused by the USMCA.148 In a 
2018 survey of 100 U.S.-based automotive executives, 63% expected USMCA-
related production cost increases and 58% believed the costs will be passed onto 
consumers.149 Many of the executives already took concrete steps to comply with the 
new USMCA requirements.150 Thirty-six percent are negotiating with suppliers to 
seek production-related cost savings and “[s]eventy-eight percent cite[d] finding 
North American suppliers or identifying alternate suppliers as a near-term priority 
for their supply chains.”151  
While the 75% requirement could increase North American employment, it could 
lead to the opposite result, with supply chains becoming even more outsourced. To 
receive tariff-free treatment under NAFTA, companies had to incorporate at least 
62.5% of their supply chains in the NAFTA region.152 If increasing to 75% proves 
too burdensome, simply paying the tariff will become the preferred option. After 
paying the tariff, there will be no trade barrier incentives to encourage companies to 
incorporate even 62.5% of their supply chains in the NAFTA region. Absent trade 
agreements levying tariffs against other countries, businesses will be free to source 
parts from anywhere in the world.  
 
ii. Automobile Wage Provisions 
 
Even if the rules of origin requirements bring jobs back to the NAFTA region, 
many of those jobs will go to lower-cost regions in Mexico. To address this issue, 
the USMCA contains several wage and workers’ rights provisions that increase the 
cost of doing business in Mexico.153 First, “[a]t least 40% of the value of a passenger 
 
price of finished goods and pass the increase on to consumers. Id. Automobile producers will likely 
implement a combination of all four options, resulting in some form of increase in the price of cars. Id. 
147 Gabrielle Jasinski, LevaData Survey: 63 Percent of Automotive Executives Believe Production 
Costs Will Increase Due to USMCA, BUS. WIRE (Jan. 10, 2019, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190110005101/en/ [https://perma.cc/CD7Q-9W4J]; 
Bridget McCrea, How Will USMCA Impact the Automotive Supply Chain?, SOURCE TODAY (Feb. 13, 
2019), https://www.sourcetoday.com/supply-chain/article/21867315/how-will-usmca-impact-the-
automotive-supply-chain [https://perma.cc/3DJF-LXMB]. 
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151 Id. 
152 See Trump’s NAFTA Changes, supra note 140. 
153 See Rebalancing Trade to Support Manufacturing, supra note 13. Because cheap labor was the 
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Brink of a Labor Revolution?, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 5, 2019), 
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uncertainty caused by President Trump’s threats to disrupt trade. Mary Beth Sheridan, Mexico Becomes 
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car and 45% of a light truck must be made by workers earning at an average of $16 
per hour.”154 Second, Mexico must pass pro-unionization laws.155 Automotive 
companies that do not meet the above requirements will be subject to the most-
favored-nation tariff of 2.5%.156 A committee will be formed to monitor Mexico’s 
progress on labor issues against clear benchmarks set by the agreement.157 NAFTA 
did not contain any provisions related to wages or workers’ rights.158 
Automobile manufacturers faced with the new USMCA wage provisions will 
therefore have three primary courses of action: (1) pay 40% to 45% of workers at 
least $16 per hour; (2) pay the 2.5% tariff and keep wages the same; or (3) if wages 
overseas are cheaper than wages in the NAFTA region, and that cost savings 
outweighs the costs and uncertainties associated with relocation, leave the NAFTA 
region for countries with cheaper wages. 
The average hourly wage for automobile assembly workers in Mexico was $7.34 
in 2017.159 In the U.S., workers involved in motor vehicles and parts manufacturing 
were paid $23.50 per hour on average in 2019.160 In China, the average automobile 
industry wage was between $5.00 and $6.00 per hour in 2017.161 Automobile 
industry wages are even cheaper in other Asian countries. In India, for example, the 
average automobile industry wage was only $1.09 per hour in 2017.162 
The USMCA wage provisions could incentivize manufacturers to hire more U.S. 
workers by making Mexican workers more expensive. However, the $16 per hour 
required wage is still almost $8 per hour less than the U.S. average automobile 
industry wage.163 Therefore, it could also incentivize manufacturers to simply raise 
wages for their workers in Mexico. In response to the wage requirements, several 
automobile manufacturers in Mexico have already chosen to triple their Mexican 
wages rather than relocate to the U.S.164 More importantly, it could cause automobile 
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manufacturers to pay a tariff and leave Mexico for lower-cost regions, such as India 
or China.165 If manufacturers in Mexico leave for Asia, connected manufacturers in 
the U.S. would likely lay off workers.  
USMCA proponents cite several points in arguing why manufacturers in Mexico 
will be unlikely to relocate to Asia. First, due to integrated supply chains, many North 
American car makers in the U.S. already conform with the requirement that 40% of 
the car be produced where the workers make at least $16 an hour.166 Second, the 
USMCA contains a sunset clause, which allows the countries to renegotiate or end 
the agreement in as early as six years and provides for the agreement to expire 
automatically after sixteen years if not specifically renewed.167 By injecting a layer 
of uncertainty into the USMCA provisions, the sunset clause discourages companies 
from relocating. If companies decide to move to another country, important USMCA 
provisions could completely change shortly after they establish their operations. 
Third, based on an assumption that free trade will continue, automobile companies 
have invested billions of dollars in new North American factories.168 Moving to Asia 
would require millions, if not billions of dollars in new investments, all of which 
could prove too risky given the sunset clause and today’s tumultuous trade climate.  
Whether the USMCA will create more employment in the U.S. manufacturing 
sector depends on thousands of decisions by individual companies, including 
decisions that turn on factors aside from the USMCA. Still, the USMCA presents 
two points of certainty. First, its sourcing and wage provisions, by increasing costs, 
necessarily make Asia a more attractive business location from a cost standpoint. 
Second, if the USMCA works as intended and companies employ more U.S. 
workers, costs to automobile companies will rise, which will increase the price of 
U.S. cars and render them less competitive in the global marketplace.169 
 
 
165 See Daniel J. Ikenson, Protectionist Love Child of the Labor Left and the Nationalist Right, CATO 
INST. (Dec. 13, 2019, 8:02 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/protectionist-love-child-labor-left-
nationalist-right [https://perma.cc/BPJ9-SVQ2].  
166 Carrie Kahn, Will NAFTA 2.0 Really Boost Mexican Wages?, NPR (Oct. 17, 2018, 9:05 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/17/657806248/will-nafta-2-0-really-boost-mexican-wages 
[https://perma.cc/CV8T-CUC5].  
167 Inu Manak & Simon Lester, Evaluating the New USMCA, CATO INST. (Dec. 11, 2019, 4:47 PM), 
https://www.cato.org/blog/evaluating-new-usmca-0 [https://perma.cc/B9CS-GKK9].  
168 Niraj Chokshi, Unions Skeptical Trump’s Trade Deal Will Bring Back Auto Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/11/business/nafta-usmca-auto-jobs.html 
[https://perma.cc/YC89-CYKF].  
169 Brian Reinbold & Yi Wen, Changing Trade Relations May Affect U.S. Auto Exports in Long Run, 
FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-
economist/first-quarter-2019/changing-trade-relations-auto-exports [https://perma.cc/2ULJ-YS5V] 
(USMCA auto provisions “could lead to decreased global demand for cars manufactured in North 
America as they become less competitive in a global market” due to higher prices; “the USMCA is a 
solution searching for a problem in regard to auto trade”); U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement: Likely 
Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors, Inv. No. TPA 105-003, USITC Pub. 4889 
(Apr. 2019) (Final) (USMCA likely to increase production costs in the United States, resulting in higher 
prices for automobiles and 140,000 fewer vehicles sold); Meet the New NAFTA, CTR. FOR AUTOMOTIVE 
RES. (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.cargroup.org/meet-the-new-nafta/ [https://perma.cc/NAE7-9CQH] 
(“Conforming to the USMCA rules and strategic responses to avoid the risk of additional tariffs will raise 
production costs for light vehicles and automotive parts, driving up consumer prices.”).  
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The substantial difference between wages in the U.S. and competing countries 
undermines U.S. manufacturing’s ability to secure a competitive advantage. NAFTA 
allowed manufacturing companies to take advantage of low wages in Mexico while 
still employing U.S. workers by assembling basic parts in Mexico and undertaking 
more complex work in the U.S.170 Though the U.S. lost millions of manufacturing 
jobs under NAFTA, even more could have lost their jobs to Asia without NAFTA.171 
The U.S. should preserve, rather than diminish, manufacturing companies’ ability to 
take advantage of low wages in Mexico while still employing U.S. workers.   
Through its protectionist labor, source, and trade requirements, the USMCA 
represents a bold, risky step in the wrong direction. The USMCA could create some 
U.S. jobs by encouraging companies to source more parts in North America and 
increasing labor costs in Mexico, but it will raise costs for automobile manufacturers 
and consumers. Because businesses will direct capital to its most profitable use, the 
USMCA’s added costs could encourage automobile companies to consider 
outsourcing to Asia even more. The USMCA will help U.S. farmers by slightly 
expanding market access into Canada, but these relatively modest agricultural gains 
could be substantially outweighed by the risks it poses to the much larger U.S. 
manufacturing industry.  
 
170 See VILLARREAL & FERGUSSON, supra note 3, at 32. 
171 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics supra note 92; see supra notes 137–38 and the accompanying 
text. 
